Abstract. Scalable group key management solutions are crucial for supporting Internet applications that are based on a group communication model. Many solutions have been proposed and of these the most efficient and scalable ones are based on logical key hierarchies (LKH) with symmetric keys organized in a tree. However, these solutions centralize trust in the group controller and make it an attractive attack target for access to communication keys for all groups supported by the controller. In this paper we propose a novel group key management approach, which uses a partially trusted controller that does not have access to communication keys and yet provides the same level of efficiency and scalability as LKH schemes. For this we develop a new public-key encryption scheme, which is based on El Gamal, and we show that the scheme is as secure as El Gamal.
Introduction
Many collaborative applications such as conferencing, command-and-control systems, white-boards, publish-subscribe systems, interactive distance-learning, and shared instruments need reliable and secure communication for large groups comprising as many as thousands of members that may leave or join groups at any time. Recently proposed solutions for reliable multicast communications for both IP multicast (e.g., Adamson et al. [1] ) and applications-layer multicast (e.g., SpinGlass [2] ) can support such large groups. Group key management is the cornerstone of providing secure communication, and the key management problem translates to ensuring that only the current group members have the session key. Therefore, the key management scheme must be efficient in changing the session key on member join and leave events and scalable to support large groups. Solutions proposed by Wong et al. [21] , Wallner et al. [20] , and Carroni et al. [5] that are based on logical key hierarchies (LKH) of symmetric keys organized in a tree provide both efficiency and scalability by reducing both group rekey operation complexity and key storage requirement to O(logN ) for group size N .
Consider the tree-based, group-oriented LKH key management scheme of Wong et al. [21] . In this scheme a trusted group controller (GC) creates and distributes symmetric keys to group members, and maintains the user-key relations. For N users GC organizes keys as the nodes of a full and balanced d-ary tree where the root node key serves as the group's session key while the remaining keys serve as key encrypting keys that are used to efficiently update the session key on member join and leave events. When a user leaves the group the server only needs to perform approximately d * log d (n) symmetric encryptions and send a message of size O(d * log d (n)) to update the session key. This illustrates the efficiency and scalability provided by this approach. However, this scheme requires GC to be fully trusted because its compromise would result in disclosure of the session key and the key encrypting keys managed by GC. Extending that argument, when a group controller manages multiple groups, its compromise leads to compromise of keys for all those groups; e.g., a GC supporting an interactive distance learning application with different groups representing different classrooms, or a GC supporting a command-and-control system where a large number of groups have permissions to access different components of the system. This has two consequences. First, the data protected by the session keys can be deciphered by the adversary. Second, the only way to recover from such a compromise is to re-key all groups managed by GC since the key encrypting keys are known to the adversary.
Both decentralized key distribution solutions (e.g., [15] ) and contributory key agreement solutions (e.g., [4] , [10] , [18] , [17] ) solve this problem by eliminating the GC but, unfortunately, they do not scale to large groups. In this paper we address this problem by developing a group key management approach that offers the efficiency and scalability of LKH schemes while minimizing trust in GC at the same time. The new approach is based on a (discrete-log) public key encryption scheme that we have developed utilizing concepts of proxy re-encryption [3] [8] [11] . The encryption scheme enables GC to maintain user-key relations but does not allow GC access to session keys directly or indirectly via decryption keys. Consequently, GC's compromise does not provide the adversary with access to session keys or to (session) key decrypting keys. The latter implies that recovery from GC's compromise does not require re-keying of the entire group. We feel that this is a useful contribution that aims to mitigate the consequences of server compromise, which is an inescapable reality indicated by recent statistics on electronic crime [6] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our group key management scheme and analyze its costs in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss related work and conclude in Section 5. Due to space limitations the security analyses and proofs are provided in [9] .
The Proposed Scheme: TASK
In this section we describe our group key management scheme, TASK − a Treebased scheme that uses Asymmetric Split Keys. TASK comprises a communication group with n members M 1 , M 2 , ..., M n , and a partially trusted group controller GC. The group is created by the first member and GC. Members then join (leave) the group with the help of a sponsor (an existing group member) and GC. TASK is similar to LKH schemes in that GC manages a d-ary key tree except that TASK uses split asymmetric keys, and GC only manages shares of the split keys (members manage the other part of the shares). Session keys are computed with member shares and, consequently, GC does not have access to them. To ensure security, session keys are updated whenever members join and leave the group.
We now provide some defintions, present the TASK public-key encryption scheme, provide an instance of the key-tree, and show how TASK supports member join and leave events.
Definitions
1. El Gamal. Let E eg = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be the notation for standard El Gamal encryption [7] . Gen is the key generating function. Hence Gen(1 k ) outputs parameters (g, p, q, a, g a ) where g, p and q are group parameters, (p being k bits), a is the private key, and y = g a mod p is the public key. The Enc algorithm is the standard El Gamal encryption algorithm and is defined as e = (mg ar mod p, g r mod p), where r is chosen at random from Z q and m is the message. To denote the action of encrypting message m with public key y, we write Enc P Ky (m). Dec is the standard El Gamal decryption algorithm and requires dividing mg ar (from e) by (g r ) a mod p. 2. TASK Encryption Keys. All members manage private keys that they use for encrypting and decrypting protocol messages. Each member has a unique private key and a set of O(log d n) private keys in its path to the root node that will be common to other members. For example, K 1 denotes member M 1 's private key, P K 1 = g K1 mod p is M 1 's public key, and K 1−9 and K 1−8 are the root private keys as illustrated in Figure 1 . GC manages corresponding private keys for members and for intermediate and root nodes that it uses for re-encrypting protocol messages; e.g., K 1 is M 1 's corresponding private key, and K 1−9 and K 1−8 are the corresponding root private keys. All private and corresponding private keys are essentially El Gamal keys and every pair of private and corresponding private keys adds up to the same value − GKEK, the Group Key Encrypting Key. However, no entity knows the value of GKEK. 3. Session Keys. The session key, also known as the Data Encrypting Key (DEK), is computed by members to be the (one-way) hash of the root private key. 4. Key Randomization. TASK private keys are often updated by either adding or subtracting random numbers. To simplify representation of key updates we define two functions. A (r1,r2,...,rn) (K) denotes the addition of n random numbers r 1 , r 2 , ..., r n to key K (mod q). Similarly, S (r1,r2,...,rn) (K) denotes the subtraction of n random numbers r 1 , r 2 , ..., r n from key K (mod q).
5.
External PKI Keys. Some protocol messages are encrypted with external PKI keys (using El Gamal) and all protocol messages are signed and verified with external PKI keys 3 (using the DSA signature algorithm). We differentiate between TASK keys and external PKI keys by placing a bar on top of external PKI keys (e.g., Enc P K GC (m) denotes encryption of message m with GC's external PKI public-key).
TASK public-key encryption scheme E
We denote the TASK Asymmetric Encryption scheme by E= (IGen, U Gen, KU, AEnc, ADec, Γ ). Here IGen is a distributed protocol executed by M 1 (the first member of the group) and GC to generate group parameters g, p and q, private and corresponding private keys K 1 and K 1 and public key P K 1 = g K1 . (K 1 is simply a random number modulo q chosen by M 1 , and K 1 is a random number modulo q chosen by GC). U Gen is a distributed protocol executed by joining member M i , an existing member sponsor M s , and GC to generate (1) a publicprivate key pair for M i , (2) if required, a private key for a (new) intermediate node along the path from M i 's location in the key-tree to the root, and (3) the corresponding private keys for GC. The U Gen protocol requires M i , M s , and GC to generate random numbers and add/subtract them from K s and K s . It is guaranteed that
KU is a key update protocol initiated by an existing member sponsor and executed by all group members and GC to update GKEK. It involves the sponsor choosing a random value r and distributing it to all other group members who add it (mod q) to their private keys, and GC choosing a random value r GC and adding it (mod q) to all corresponding private keys; i.e., GKEK is modified by adding r and r GC . AEnc and ADec are identical to Enc and Dec defined above for El Gamal. Γ is a transformation function which transforms a message encrypted with one TASK public key into a message encrypted with another TASK public key. For example, once U Gen has been executed for members M i and M j , Γ (K i ,K j ) would take as input an encrypted message of the form (g RKi S, g R ) and output
where S is the message. The fact that
The encryption scheme E is secure if (1) it retains the same level of security as the standard El Gamal scheme against all adversaries A, (2) the GC cannot distinguish between encryptions of two messages even with access to multiple corresponding private keys, and (3) a group member cannot distinguish between encryptions of two messages for which he does not have a decryption key (even if he has other private keys). The proofs are given in [9] .
Theorem 1 Let E = (IGen, U Gen, KU, AEnc, ADec, Γ ) be the TASK en All other members join the group with the help of a sponsor (an exisiting group member) and GC. We illustrate the join of member M 9 in an existing group of eight members in Figure 1 . To join the group, M 9 sends a JOIN message to GC. GC then determines the insertion node in the tree, which will either be shallowest rightmost node if the join does not increase the height of the tree, or the root node otherwise. GC also determines (and then informs) the sponsor for the join event to be the rightmost leaf node in the subtree rooted at the insertion point; M 8 in this case. These join and sponsor determination messages are separate from any join messages generated by the underlying group communication system, though they may be combined for increased efficiency. The TASK join protocol is a three-step protocol illustrated below but consists of only two communication rounds: one in which the sponsor M 8 sends unicast messages to M 9 and GC, and a multicast message to members M 1 ... M 7 , and the second in which M 9 sends a unicast message to GC. All TASK multicast messages are encrypted with TASK keys while unicast messages are encrypted with either the receiver's external PKI public-key or with TASK keys.
TASK PROTOCOL FOR MEMBER M9's JOIN EVENT
Step 1:
-M8 generates random value r and adds it all private keys; i.e., K8 ← Ar(K8), K789 ← Ar(K78), and K1−9 ← Ar(K1−8). Compute new session key: DEK ← h(K1−9). -M8 generates random value r9 and computes a temporary key for M9:
T K9 ← Ar 9 (K8).
Step 2:
-Members M1...M7 decrypt r from M8's message using private key K78, and add r (mod q) to all their private keys; e.g., member M1 computes K1 ← Ar(K1), K123 ← Ar(K123), and K1−9 ← Ar(K1−8). Members also compute the new session key: DEK ← h(K1−9). -GC decrypts random values from M8 and stores them temporarily. -M9 decrypts and stores private keys from M8, computes new session key from K1−9, generates random value r9 and computes his private key:
Step 3:
-GC computes corresponding private key for M9: K 9 ← Sr 9 ,r9 (K 8 ).
-GC chooses a random value rGC and adds it (mod q) to all corresponding private keys; i.e., ∀i K i = Ar GC (K i ).
To add M 9 to the group, the sponsor M 8 generates private key K 789 , M 9 generates private key K 9 , and GC generates corresponding private keys K 789 and K 9 . All key generations are accomplished by adding and subtracting random values from previously held keys, and are therefore computationally inexpensive operations. Furthermore, in order to ensure that M 9 cannot access the previous session key, all private keys in the path from the joining node to the root node are updated by adding a random value r to the previous values. However, since TASK requires all private and corresponding private keys to add up to the same value (GKEK), r is added to all private keys held by the group members. A new session key is then computed from the updated root private key. In Figure   1 , the change in key values is denoted by different subscripts and fill patterns for the tree nodes. The three-step join protocol is detailed below.
In the first step, M 8 generates a random value r that it adds to all private keys and a temporary key for M 9 . M 8 also computes the new session key from K 1−9 . M 8 then sends (1) to M 9 the group parameters, the temporary key, and the private keys in the path from M 9 's location in the tree to the root (encrypted with M 9 's public key), (2) to GC the random values for generating corresponding private keys (encrypted with GC's public key), and (3) to members M 1 ...M 7 the random value r (encrypted with public key P K 1−8 ). In the second step, members M 1 ...M 7 decrypt r with private key K 1−8 , update their private keys by adding r, and compute the new session key DEK = h (K 1−9 ). In addition, M 9 generates private key K 9 and sends to GC a random value for generating corresponding private key K 9 . Note that M 9 has a private key that is not known to the sponsor even though the sponsor's key was used to generate it. In the third step GC computes corresponding private keys K 9 and chooses a random value r GC , which it adds (mod q) to all corresponding private keys. At the end of the join protocol we have added r and r GC to GKEK and all the splits of this key add up to the new value.
The join protocol also presents an easy way for a sponsor to refresh the private keys and the session key at any point in time. The sponsor simply chooses a random value r, adds it to all her private keys, and broadcasts it to the entire group by encrypting it with the (old) root private key. On receiving this message, all other group members decrypt r and add it to their private keys. The new session key will be the hash of the new root private key.
Member Leave Protocol
We illustrate the leave of member M 9 in Figure 1 above. M 9 informs GC of his desire to leave the group and GC then determines (and informs) the sponsor to the right-most leaf node of the subtree rooted at the leaving member's sibling node; M 8 in this case. The leave of member M 9 is enforced by deleting corresponding private key K 9 , updating private keys in the path from M 9 's node to the root node, and changing the session key. Private keys are changed by adding a random number to previous value and since TASK requires all private and corresponding values to add to GKEK, the random number is added to all private keys. The TASK leave protocol is a three-step protocol that requires two communication rounds; one in which the sponsor sends a unicast message to GC, and the second in which GC sends a multicast message to members M 1 ...M 7 . The three-step leave protocol is detailed below.
In the first step, M 8 generates a random value r to be added to all private keys and sends r to GC encrypted with his TASK public key P K 8 . In the second step, GC deletes the key (and node) K 9 , transforms the encrypted random value using a minimal set of corresponding private keys (in this case O(log d n) keys) such that all remaining members can decrypt r (but M 9 cannot), and sends the multicast message to the remaining group members. (See Section 2.2 for details on the transformation function.) The transformation is used to distribute r because we cannot use the old root key to encrypt r (since M 9 has that key). In the third step, group members decrypt r and compute the new session key, and GC adds a random value r GC to all corresponding private keys. Note that at the end of the leave protocol we have added r and r GC to GKEK and that all the splits of this key add up to the new value.
TASK PROTOCOL FOR MEMBER M9's LEAVE EVENT
-M8 generates random value r and it adds it (mod q) to all its remaining private keys; i.e., K8 ← Ar(K8), K78 ← Ar(K789), and K1−8 ← Ar(K1−9). Compute the new session key: DEK ← h(K1−8).
-Members M1...M7 decrypt r from the message sent by GC and add it (mod q) to all their private keys. They compute the new session key: DEK ← h(K1−8). -GC chooses a random value rGC and adds it (mod q) to all corresponding private keys.
Analysis
In this section we analyze the communication and computation costs for TASK and discuss its advantages over LKH schemes. In Table 1 we provide costs focusing on the number of communication rounds, total number of messages, serial number of expensive modular exponentiations, and the serial number of signature generations and verifications (we use DSA signatures for message authentication). The serial cost is the greatest cost incurred by any member in any given round, and assumes parallelization within each round. The total number of messages is the sum of all messages sent by the members in any given round (unicast and multicast messages counted separately). In addition, we provide the maximum size of any unicast and multicast message sent by the members as well as the key storage costs for executing TASK protocols. We separate costs incurred by members and by GC. We compare the costs of our scheme with those for the LKH scheme of Wong et al. [21] . We ignore tree balancing costs, which are computed to be O(log 2 n) for binary trees by Moyer et al. [12] and we expect balancing costs of similar complexity for our scheme.
Comparison. From Table 1 we can see that TASK scales to large groups just like LKH. There are only minor differences in both communication and computation costs except for modular exponentiations, which are an artifact of using asymmetric keys. Even there the costs are constant except when GC needs to re-encrypt messages for a member leave event in which case the costs are O(log d n) and scale to large groups. (We have not included the average 2(h + 1) cost for symmetric encrytions incurred by GC in LKH [21] because these costs are orders of magnitude smaller than exponentiation costs). Advantages. While providing the efficiency and scalability of LKH, TASK also provides minimization of trust in GC. If GC is compromised, the adversary will get access to all corresponding private keys but will not be able to get any session keys since the corresponding private keys cannot be used to decrypt any session keys. (Note that GC is a partially trusted entity because it manages corresponding private key trees, and yet (1) it can get compromised and (2) it cannot discover any session keys). Furthermore, once GC has been re-instated after recovery, the adversary's advantage will be nullified by updating the private and corresponding private keys without having to re-key the entire group. A member will initiate and execute a refresh operation to update private keys and establish a new session key, and GC will update corresponding private keys by adding a random number to them. However, if GC and one group member are simultaneously compromised, the adversary gets access to the current session key, the member's private keys, GC's corresponding private keys, and to the GKEK for that member's group − by adding the compromised member's private and corresponding private keys. In that case the group will have to be re-keyed, but this will not affect any other groups supported by GC.
A large number of group key management solutions have been proposed and [13] provides a comprehensive survey of these solutions. Recently, several performance optimization and reliable rekeying techniques have been proposed for LKH schemes. Periodic rekeying techniques [16] , [22] and tree management based on usage patterns [23] further improve the scalability and efficiency of LKH schemes while reliable rekeying [24] , [22] enables secure group communication in environments where reliable multicast communication may not be available. However, all of these schemes fully trust the GC, and we provide an efficient and scalable group key management scheme that minimizes this trust.
Conclusion
In this paper we presented a novel group key management scheme, TASK, which minimizes trust in the group controller and yet retains the efficiency and scalability of LKH schemes. We have shown that TASK can be extended to support application driven group merges and partitions, and will present that work in the near future. In the future, we will also apply reliable re-keyeing and performance optimization techniques proposed for LKH to TASK and analyze the results.
